less-developed countries on foreign direct investment,`local' regulatory regimes are often lax and poorly policed. Not withstanding the variable public interest in Third World conditions, many global corporations appear to operate at higher standards than those required by local regulation (Angel and Rock, 2005) .
In this paper, we suggest that corporate accountability may be less an issue of government policy and regulation (assuming laws and regulations are properly observed) and more an issue of consumer-market and financial-market pressure. Our goal is to explain how market position and financial expectations can affect corporate policies and practices, driving higher standards in remote jurisdictions or at least deliberate management of those standards in ways consistent with`home' expectations. In doing so, we do not mean to suggest that accountability is an enlightened process of corporate beneficence. In point of fact, we identify`agents' in both kinds of markets who have an economic interest in promoting and sustaining accountability. Most important in this regard are institutional investors and especially pension funds; we show that their interests straddle both markets being factored into the metrics used to assess corporate performance (see also Hawley and Williams, 2005) . Our paper develops an argument begun elsewhere about the pivotal role of institutional investors in Anglo-American societies and beyond (Blackburn, 2002 , Clark, 2000 Clark and Hebb, 2004) .
The paper is largely conceptual and illustrative rather than a detailed report of empirical research. We rely upon a set of analytical tools developed in economics and finance about Anglo-American and European firms that are light on tangible assets (such as plant and equipment) but heavy on intangible assets (such as brand image and corporate reputation) (Teece, 2002) . Additionally, we assume that incumbent managers are compensated, in part, by share-options and performance-related bonuses and that shareholders are many but dispersed. Part of the argument relies on an assumption that a crucial measure of corporate value is its price/earnings (P/E ) ratio. Consistent with Lowenstein (1996) , it is assumed that managers manage what is measured; that is, the objective function of the firm combines a concern for both variables. To sustain a targeted P/E ratio requires many activities, not least of which is the deliberate management of market sensitive information. (1) Most importantly, it requires corporate transparency in the sense that financial investors prefer to be confident about forecast earnings and consequent stock-market pricing (Hebb, 2005) . These assumptions and logical connections are the building blocks of our framework.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. In the next section, we set out the core components of our argument, concentrating on the status of Anglo-American firms as`fictive persons' and the scope of their responsibilities as private economic agents. In this regard, we distinguish between Anglo-American firms and their continental European counterparts, suggesting that the latter may have rather different mandates than the former. Thereafter, we deal with the significance of brand image and corporate reputation for firms that rely upon intangible assets (section 3), the increasing importance of transparency for financial markets and institutional investors (section 4), and instances in which corporate reputation has been significant for institutional investors (section 5). In conclusion (section 6), we draw implications from our framework for understanding the behaviour of global corporations, emphasizing the importance of third-party activists.
(1) Though not discussed in any detail in this paper, we assume that financial markets rely upon information to assess corporate value. Whatever the connection between market pricing and real commodity exchange, in the first instance stock markets economize on information collection and processing using summary statistics and metrics to indicate value (see Clark et al, 2006; Wilhelm and Downing, 2001 ).
Theory of the firm
In this paper, we treat the corporation as a private economic agent. (2) This can be justified in a number of ways, including reference to the relevant literature in economics (Jensen, 2000) . Also, English common law assigned firms involving more than ownermanagers a distinctive legal statusöthat is, the status of a`fictive person'. In effect, this enabled corporations to own property, undertake contractual relationships, transact with others whether individuals or other entities, and generally behave as if they were unitary agents with the same economic rights as anybody else. Consistent with the common-law institution, this approach has evolved over time with regard to changing economic circumstances and has been incorporated in statute in many countries. For those interested in comparative economic development, F W Maitland argued that this approach to the corporation encouraged higher rates of economic growth and institutional innovation (being especially important in facilitating the transfer of wealth between the agrarian aristocracy and the emerging urban industrial elites). (3) This is a crucial reference point for the evolution of financial markets, represented in contemporary global maps of law and finance (see La Porta et al, 1998) .
Not only is the Anglo-American corporation treated as a fictive person, it is also sometimes treated as a private person with related rights and responsibilities. Unlike many of its continental European cousins, the Anglo-American corporation is empowered to maximize shareholder value (amongst other goals). It is not required to balance stakeholder interests, community sentiments, or moral imperatives. The Anglo-American corporation claims the right to act, just as any other person claims the right to act, according to its best interests. This does not mean, of course, that the Anglo-American corporation can ignore properly established laws and regulations. But it does mean that the corporation need only respect those obligations imposed by law even if the public at large might expect more of such institutions than they would expect of themselves. The combination of private status and wide-ranging discretion provides a normative claim as to how the firm should be treated and a positive reference point for analysing firm decisionmaking. It also provides a rationale for understanding the significance of often-stated arguments to the effect that``the business of business is business'' (Friedman, 1962, page 11) .
Let us be clear, however, about our own opinion on these issues. First, whatever the status of legal doctrine, public expectations are not limited to doctrine and properly so (Williams, 2002) . As recent events have shown, the corporation as a fictive person may be treated as an economic agent but this need not translate into the same status as real' individuals in public debate about moral issues. (4) Second, in any event, much of the debate about the global corporation and its treatment of people around the world rarely considers legal doctrine; shareholder resolutions at annual general meetings argue for greater accountability and transparency for a wide variety of economic, (2) We do not mean to suggest that corporations are the superrational input^output processing machines of conventional economic theory. Quite the contrary. The related literature in economic geography and management recognizes that corporations are, more often than not, beset by internal conflict and rivalry (see Wrigley, 1997, Schoenberger, 1997) . (3) Runciman and Ryan (2003) have edited a collection of Maitland's papers on the corporation and the trust. Compare with Hansmann and Kraakman (2002, pages 62^63 [Cal 2002]) . Therein the CSC was asked to rule on the status of Nikeöwhether its private interests as an economic agent could be extended into the public area, allowing Nike to engage in public debate about global standards unencumbered by tests of veracity associated with state law (regarding competition and advertising). The CSC decided that the corporation did not have the same`rights of free speech' of an ordinary citizen. The US Supreme Court declined to review this decision. environmental, and social reasons. Third, even so, one should not underestimate the interest of senior executives in the fictive-person doctrine. For those at the top of the corporate hierarchy, the doctrine represents both an arena for action and a means of legitimating decisionmaking. Moral claims are one thing. Understanding the motives of global corporations in relation to global standards also requires an understanding of economic incentives (see Christopherson, 2005; Smith, 1990; .
In what follows, we assume that senior managers manage and that owners are shareholders in the sense that they buy and sell common stock. The ownership of such companies is dispersedöfew institutional shareholders devote more than a fraction of one per cent of their assets to individual firms and most own stock as part of an investment strategy designed to diversify portfolio risk (Clark et al, 2006) . At the limit, the majority of institutional shareholders are shareholders because companies are included in an index product representing some portion of the entire stock market. In this respect, with the recognition that the publicly listed corporation has an obligation to shareholder value, the principal-agent problem looms large (Williamson, 1996) . In the absence of adequate incentives linking manager compensation with corporate stock-market performance, managers' interests in their own welfare may dominate corporate strategy. As we know, of course, over the 1990s concerted efforts were made to align manager incentives with stockholder value. Codes of corporate governance have been introduced so as to encourage the efficient third-party pricing of corporate value. We acknowledge that these types of instruments may not be consistent with social welfare nor need they be entirely effective notwithstanding recent initiatives in response to scandals of corporate governance (Coffee, 2003) .
The analysis in subsequent sections of the paper focuses upon corporations that are light on tangible assets (and liabilities) rather than corporations that are heavy on tangible assets (and liabilities). Much has been written about the latter type of corporation in economic geography and elsewhere. Rereading the economic geography of the corporation over the past twenty years, one is struck by the fact that, until recently, the literature was obsessed with manufacturing corporations with extensive networks of production, suppliers, and distributors; compare with Zingales (2000) for a theory of firms light on tangible assets. This is a world familiar to many. It is also a world that demands a distinctive analytical framework and conceptual tools. For example, it is amenable to institutional approaches to the division of power between management and labour, emphasizing entrenched interests and the distribution of income (Dore, 2000, chapter 9) . As shown elsewhere, it is also amenable to the use of concepts such as embeddedness, sunk costs, and the spatial fix (Clark and Wrigley, 1997) .
Characteristically, corporations that depend upon intangible assets such as reputation and brand image, and its management for value, discount heavily the inherited configuration of production. Though these kinds of firms may sell enormous numbers of units into global consumer markets, their sites of production are, more often than not, relatively small, in recognition of the low threshold for reaping economies of scale. Furthermore, with control over production technology it is easy enough to outsource production, subject to the costs of maintaining standards of quality consistent with the brand image of products. Though price competition is important in developed markets, brand image and its management are a refuge from head-to-head price competition. In this respect, the functional value of a product may be less important than consumer lifestyles, tastes, and preferences (Lury, 1996) . The derivation of corporate value has shifted from managing the efficiency of productive assets, including the relationship between capital and labour, to managing the`reception' of product brands and corporate reputation. This is a`new' world aptly described by Wrigley and Lowe (2002) amongst others.
Valuing the firm
There are many different ways of valuing the firm (see Ho and Lee, 2004) . For our purposes, the most relevant perspective is that of an institutional investoröan investor that holds a broad portfolio of market stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments, being less concerned with the intrinsic value of an individual firm than the value of firms as expressed in stock prices. In what follows, we provide a reference point for valuing the firm, its stock-market price and its reported earnings.
The price/earnings ratio
Fund managers and investment companies distinguish themselves in relation to the market for financial services by particular theories of market value, including reference to issues such as`growth' (expected short-term stock price appreciation) and`value' (expected long-term stock price appreciation) (see Graham and Dodd's 2003 republished classic) . Some advocate a trading strategy that takes advantage of short-term mispricing of stocks and the (relative) irrationality of others. Some argue that we should be concerned with fundamentals, particularly the long-term prospects for industrial sectors as well as the economic prospects of whole markets and economies. More theoretically, there are those who have argued that stock markets are efficient in the sense that all available information is factored into current and expected prices and that it is impossible systematically to beat the market (Fama, 1970) . In this paper, we assume that some markets are more efficient than others and that efficiency can vary over time (Clark and Wo¨jcik, 2003) .
One important reference point for valuing individual stocks, sectors, and markets is the P/E ratio. By convention, the P/E ratio divides the market price of a firm (P) with the reported net earnings of the firm (E ) (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003, page 792) . Imagine that there are two firms A and B such that firm A trades at $10 per share and reports earnings of $1 per share and firm B trades at $40 per share and reports earnings of $2 per share. Their respective P/E ratios are 10 and 20. Which firm is more valuable? Considering that the Standard & Poor 500 long-term P/E ratio is about 15, it would seem that firm A is undervalued and firm B is overvalued (Shiller, 2002) . This may be justified if A and B come from industries with very different`legacy' costs. For example, A may come from automobile manufacturing and B may come from computer software.
Implied, therefore, are two time horizons over which valuation occurs: quarterly reports of corporate earnings based on current prices, and future expectations captured by reported earnings measured against expected earnings. If reported earnings continue to disappoint investors, we would expect share market prices to fall to match revenue expectations. On the other side of the process, if a firm's reported earnings exceed expectations over successive time periods, the firm's share price may increase in anticipation of higher earnings. (5) As a result of this series of positive quarterly reports, the firm may have a good reputation in capital markets, whereas the former underperforming firm may have a poor reputation on the basis of its series of below-expected quarterly earnings reports (this point is taken up in more detail later in the paper). (6) (5) We suggest this kind of logic for its utility in understanding how market agents evaluate value. But we should also acknowledge that some analysts dispute the implied historical significance of the`reversion to the mean' thesis underpinning claims that market agents systematically value companies against a benchmark P/E ratio (see Dimson et al, 2002) . (6) More complex calculations about the return on capital invested may be factored into share price such that being`undervalued' is an expression of a variety of issues recognized by analysts but not directly included in the equation (see Madden, 1999) . Over the mid-1990s to late 1990s, of course, P/E ratios were often ignoredösidelined by the momentum induced by herd behaviour (speculation) (Shiller, 2000) . Recently, P/E ratios have returned as a useful metric by which institutional investors judge relative value (see Alford et al, 2004 ).
Earnings, brand image, and management
Given the significance we attribute to the P/E ratio, management of the flow of reported corporate earnings is a crucial decisionmaking variable for corporate executives and shareholders. For companies reliant upon their place in consumer markets for the flow of earnings, managers are very sensitive to the`reception' of their products in home markets and other markets across the world. Many corporations have followed Levitt (1983) who argued that global corporations should use their proprietary interest in branded products to dominate not only their home markets but to extend their reach to other markets in the North and in the South. By Levitt's account, and in comparison to multinational corporations, the global corporation uses branded products to fashion local tastes and preferences, taking advantage of low-cost sites of production to reap economies of scale in the drive for market share in each and every market. Over the past twenty years, Levitt's recipe for global strategy has become a point of reference for many dismayed about the cultural consequences of globalization.
Notice, however, that brand image and its management rely upon the integrity and authenticity of brand image itself. There is an extensive literature on this topic, not easily summarized considering the intersection between brand image, aesthetics, and the semiotics of meaning (Schmitt and Simonson, 1997) . At this point, we would suggest that brand image and its management depend on three principles. First, brand image is designed, more often than not, to be univocal in the sense that it relates to commonly recognized aspirations, yet it is local in the sense that it seeks a connection with market-specific tastes and preferences. Second, brand image and its management seek to exclude competing images and counterinterpretations of the image. Third, brand image is necessarily compact, squeezing into a distinctive symbol desirable conceptions of quality and relative price. For many corporate managers, the best brand image is one that can be exported around the world and sold at a price that denotes quality. Price competition on just the functional value of a product is anathema to brand image and management.
By this account, reported earnings are the result of deliberately fostering brand image and managing its reception in home and global markets. To do so requires intellectual capital, taste-conscious image consultants, and high-cost representatives of the brand (such as David Beckham and Michael Jordan). Not surprisingly, once brand image has been created and deployed across markets, corporate executives have a huge interest in protecting and enhancing its value. At the same time, of course, competitors have an interest in aligning their own products with the dominant industry-related brand image, whereas those appalled at the dominance of brand image may deliberately seek to undercut its integrity and claims of authenticity (Klein, 2000) . In the best scenario, a successful brand image generates higher levels of earnings across geographically dispersed marketsöearnings returned to the parent corporation in the West. Higher earnings and the perception of market dominance may convince financial analysts to place such firms on their`buy' lists, prompting further increases in company stock prices.
Reputation and the stock market
We should also recognize that senior executives have a significant interest in the reputation of their firms in global stock markets. Stock options, performance bonuses, and related forms of incentive-based compensation packages are linked, in various ways, to corporate stock-market performance. During the 1990s, of course, this link became notorious in that the promise of great wealth from exercising underpriced stock options encouraged some senior executives deliberately to`manipulate' the nature and quality of information released to global stock markets. The indictment of senior executives for fraud and the violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations in firms such as Enron and WorldCom are indicative of gross failures of corporate governance and market scrutiny (see Coffee, 2003; Gordon, 2003) . In this regard, public-sector pension funds have made transparency an important goal in their campaigns for improved standards of corporate governance (Hebb, 2005) . Whatever the significance of these failures of corporate governance, performance-based incentives remain a staple component of many senior executives' compensation packages. They have a direct interest in the stock prices of their firms (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) .
As we know, however, the stock price of a firm combines an assessment of the current value of the firm relative to reported earnings plus expectations of increased or decreased value' over the short and medium terms. Indeed, in the relatively efficient markets of the Anglo-American world, in which there is a great deal of information about the current circumstances of large-cap firms, expectations may be the single most important element in determining stock-market prices. Those prices are themselves the product of past expectationsöwhether those expectations were realized or were dominated by surprising news, good and bad. We also know that financial analysts seek cost-effective ways of summarizing the vast amount of data available on listed firms.`Reputation' is used throughout the industry to represent expectations about future market prices.
A good reputation is a signal to the financial market and analysts in particular that corporate`value' is likely to be preserved and enhanced over the future. A good reputation is also a way of minimizing the intrusion of financial analysts and corporategovernance specialists into matters of manager discretion and simultaneously suggesting to the public at large that there is a consistent and mutually beneficial relationship between corporate managers' interests and shareholder value. By contrast, a poor reputation is almost always associated with a sequence of`surprising' news of less than expected reported earnings, problems of business strategy, and perhaps poor corporate governance. Once established, a poor reputation invites greater scrutiny of managers' performance. As recent events have shown, it also invites institutional investors to campaign actively in favour of internal`reform' aimed at managers' compensation packages, and their roles and responsibilities (compare with Faccio and Lasfer, 2002) . A poor reputation may also signal vulnerability in the market for corporate control.
There is obviously a close connection between corporate reputation and the brand image and management of products. But that relationship is not entirely symmetrical. Some corporations, such as Unilever, are large bundles of branded products each with distinctive labels and markets spread across the world. In effect, such firms may be relatively anonymous, being enormous portfolios of differentiated products and markets, such that their reliance on any one branded product is trivial in relation to the revenue streams associated with products in other markets. On the other hand, there are corporations whose reported earnings rely upon the performance of a small group of related branded products in overlapping consumer markets. In many cases, an extended range of related products is only as good as the market reception of their flagship products. In these cases, stock-market reputation and brand image and management may be intimately related. In other cases, however, financial analysts may be content with using corporate reputation as the summary indicator for assessing expected value, recognizing that the portfolio of products and markets is such that knowledge about any individual branded product is largely irrelevant. Even so, there are significant coordination costs and transaction costs involved in managing corporations with diversified portfolios of branded products. There is clearly a limit to this kind of business strategy, which is widely acknowledged in the investment industry and the management literature. (7) (7) See the pessimistic assessment of Unilever's earnings and competitive strategy published in The New York Times 29 April 2004 under the heading``Profit falls nearly 20% at Unilever''. Available on-line at http://query.nytimes.com.
Transparency and market value
The linkage between brand image and corporate reputation is illustrated in figure 1 . Brand management and reported corporate earnings are directly linked through consumer sales. Such sales are dependant on the reception of the product in consumer markets. Perceived value, local tastes, and preferences play a direct role in product reception, and, as a result, management spends considerable resources on managing the flow of information that informs such consumer preferences (see, for example, Lowenstein, 1996) . In any given time period the revenue that drives reported earnings is derived from both the revenue generated in the consumer market in the previous time period plus an error term that captures both positive and negative surprises in the market.
When corporate behaviour anywhere along the supply chain runs counter to its compressed brand signal, the resulting loss of revenue is captured in changing revenue. Quarterly-earnings surprises create a sequence of disruptions that over time disturbs even the flows of expected revenue. Within capital markets, falls in expected earnings drive the decline in share price. As a result, management seeks to control unanticipated surprises (or variance) that might create volatility in reported earnings. Though a company's reputation can survive a single drop in reported earnings in time t, it cannot maintain a good capital-market reputation in the face of significant volatility in reported earnings over a two to three year time period.
In the upper-left-hand quadrant of the matrix (see figure 1 ) we find firms with strong reputations. Here, reported earnings match expected earnings, with little volatility in this spaceöreputation is derived from the positive flow of expected quarterly earnings over time. As described above, some firms sell in overlapping consumer markets with a small group of related branded products. For these firms it is particularly important that product and company reputation reinforce the compressed messages that such firms deliver into the marketplace. Some global firms are situated in the upper-right-hand quadrant of the matrix, with large bundles of branded products each with distinctive labels and markets spread across the world; again, the firms seek external confirmation of value in these far-flung markets that a strong reputation provides. One advantage of being`located' in this space is that, if and when subsidiary firms come under attack in consumer markets, the parent corporation can jettison them without damage to its own reputation or to that of the other firms in its massive holdings. As a result, these often faceless global corporations are less vulnerable to unexpected drops in earnings should their brands fail. However, many firms prefer to be located in the upper-left-hand box, in which strong brand recognition compresses multiple positive messages that reinforce their positive capital-market reputations. We would place a global confectionary firm, for example, in this space. Their strategy of acquiring selected high-quality branded products is a good example of the intersection between brand management and positive corporate reputation so important to these companies. In this space, however, the enormous value placed on individual brands leaves these firms hostage to counterclaims that cut across the brand images and acquired reputations that these companies would wish to sustain. Nowhere was the clash of claims over brand and reputation more evident than the 1999 Seattle antiglobalisation riots in which the McDonald's golden arches, the Nike`swoosh', and the Starbucks logo all came under fire. The lower-lefthand box captures the space in which strong brand message is countered by direct assaults on corporate reputation in financial markets. The impact of such reputational attacks may be felt by senior managers in terms of lower stock prices and may flow back to consumer markets as measured in shocks to reported revenue.
Outside agents, usually nongovernmental organizations and other committed parties, use the media as a form of involuntary corporate disclosure, releasing negative information designed to disrupt the desired brand images and corporate reputations that companies wish to sustain (Freidberg, 2004) . Such media campaigns often include direct attacks on the motives of senior company executives, who can have a visceral reaction to seeing their names associated with corporate misdeeds and splashed across national newspapers (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Attacks on brand image combined with name-and-shame campaigns have proven effective in delivering messages designed to disturb consumer loyalty and change corporate behaviour. Outside agents attempt to provoke savvy consumers into avoiding branded products made under substandard conditions with an aim of punishing corporate executives in financial markets. In most cases their compensation packages are directly affected by the value of their stock options measured in current share prices. Even slight changes in consumer demand, captured by earning declines and signaled to capital markets, can affect investor and analyst expectations.
Such changes in expectations are further amplified through the P/E ratio, or the amount that an investor is willing to pay for each dollar earned by the company. This number measures changes in corporate value both directly and indirectly and is carefully scrutinized by investors. Figure 2 demonstrates the major P/E ratio shifts prompted by changes in quarterly earnings. Corporations seldom worry when earnings and price are positive, a region found in the upper-left-hand quadrant of the matrix. Here we usually find stocks sought by`growth' investors, in which good corporate news is followed by increases in stock price, maintaining equilibrium in the P/E ratio. In the lower-left-hand quadrant we find positive earnings with declining stock price. These companies tend to be in sectors with declining future prospects, in which current earnings are discounted against future expectations. This quadrant tends to attract`value' investors seeking solid underlying fundamentals in firms that may be`mispriced' by the market. With positive earnings and low prices, this quadrant attracts value investors who seek low P/E ratios with underlying strong fundamentals. It is the two boxes in the right half of the matrix with declining earnings that are of concern to corporations and investors alike. Even if share prices increase, as we find in the upper-right-hand box, the decline in earnings is amplified in the capital market through a direct increase in P/E ratio. Such a signal prompts investors to sell and the result is the decline in both price and earnings found in the lower-right-hand box.
In light of the importance of P/E ratios to companies and investors alike, and the vulnerability of corporate earnings öand, by extension, share pricesöto reputational attack, investors increasingly demand levels of transparency in corporate behaviour and greater financial and nonfinancial disclosure. Once transparency is in place investors use their ownership position to demand higher firm-level standards of behaviour as a means of protecting their investments from the negative impact of reputational attack (Clark and Hebb, 2004; Hebb, 2005; Hebb and Wo¨jcik, 2005) . We contend that increased corporate transparency is inextricably linked to value both in consumer and in capital markets, with direct consequences for the actors that dominate each domain (see also Saenz, 2005) .
For pension-fund investors, global`value' is no longer restricted to just the financial aspects of firms' behaviour; it now also includes social and environmental standards of behaviour. The world of pension-fund investing is one of constant calculation of risk and return. In order to judge adequately the risk from investment, institutional investors increasingly demand greater financial and nonfinancial disclosure from firms in their portfolios. Given the linkage between brand value and share price, such firm-level transparency provides institutional investors with the information necessary to make judgements about future corporate performance.
Institutional investors, as indicated earlier in this paper, seek increased transparency with less regard to the broader social obligations of the firm and more regard to protecting their investments over time. Just as the effects of attacks on brand image may leap across to capital markets, the reverse is also true in that the increased transparency and raised standards of corporate behaviour demanded by investors can have positive effects on consumer markets with a resulting increase in firm earnings over time. The opposite also holds for firms with poor corporate social and environmental standards. Transparency in capital markets can make information on`poor' corporate behaviour available to consumers. Increased information about the firm enables those inside and outside of the firm to be more effective monitors of corporate behaviour. In these cases, transparency can be a catalyst for attacks on brand image and may even prompt action by those seeking to hold firms accountable to higher social and environmental standards (Dowell et al, 2000) .
Institutional-investor strategies
To illustrate the significance of reputational issues in capital markets, we draw upon the experience of the USS (one of the largest institutional investors in the United Kingdom). This fund actively engages companies in their investment portfolio in order to raise corporate, social, and environmental standards of behaviour. We draw upon a series of semistructured interviews over the last two years with senior managers and trustees, combined with extensive internal and external document reviews. We use our own research to develop a deeper understanding of the intersection between engagement and corporate reputation, and its results in terms of changing corporate behaviour (see also Clark and Hebb, 2004; Hebb and Wo¨jcik, 2005) .
USS is a multiemployer defined-benefit plan providing retirement benefits for nearly two-hundred-thousand current and retired UK university staff. It is considered to be a young plan with current active contributing members far outweighing plan beneficiaries. USS faces long-term risk rather than short-term risk; it must be able to provide for its current members in the distant future. Consequently, the temporal structure of USS liabilities makes the plan sensitive to the long-term value of its holdings. With as much as 56% of assets in domestic equity markets and 23% of assets in international stocks, the precipitous decline of global financial markets in the aftermath of the technology, media, and telecommunications bubble hit the pension fund hard, with its annual performance slipping below the benchmark for three years running. In 2002 the fund returned À16.7%, with its asset base falling from »22 billion (2000) USS began its ambitious programme of responsible investment in 2000 after considerable internal lobbying from a group of USS members under the banner of`Ethics for USS'. (8) A letter-writing campaign resulted in four-thousand cards requesting ethical screening of investments delivered to the USS senior managers and board members. The lobby group sought the outright removal of firms judged to be unethical from the USS investment portfolio on the assumption that this would, in some way, penalize firms by restricting access to capital. (9) USS senior management resisted the use of negative screens and instead opted for more positive engagement with companies in their portfolio. They took the unusual step of identifying climate change as the topic through which they would engage firms. (10) Broad as this agenda might appear, the number one and number five holdings in the USS investment portfolio were British Petroleum (BP) and Shell Oil, in sum accounting for »1 billion of their »15 billion portfolio (representing their significance in the FTSE100). When considered in light of the impending impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the entire sector, it is not surprising that these companies should be the target of USS engagement.
(8) In our research on pension-fund corporate engagement, this is one of a few instances in which plan members were the catalyst for such intervention. In the vast majority of cases, plan members have little power. Exit, voice, and loyalty are not options for plan members; their participation is taken for granted by plan administrators (Clark, 2004) . (9) There is no evidence that screening-out makes any difference to firms' access to or price of capital. Stock sold through such a strategy is bought by other investors without regard to the intentions of the seller. Portfolio investors rarely hold more than thirty basis points of any individual stock; only in a few instances is ownership so concentrated in the hands of a few investors that a concerted selling strategy adversely affects stock prices [something possible in the recent AFL-CIO (a US union movement) campaign against Safeway stores in the United States]. (10) Most pension funds that use their ownership position to raise firm-level standards first identify corporate governance (reputation) concerns with which to engage companies. Once active in the process of engagement, their focus extends to broader social and environmental (earnings-related) aspects of firm behaviour. Otherwise, headline news of corporate environmental and social problems become the cue for institutional investors to look more closely at their holdings in a particular firm.
In 2001 USS released the report Climate Change: A Risk Management Challenge for Institutional Investors, opening with the following statement from the authors Mansley and Dlugolecki (2001) :`C limate change is a major emerging risk management challenge for institutional investors. Institutional investors, and pension funds in particular, aim to provide pensions and other benefits through long-term investment. They can also be seen as universal investors' in that, due to their size, they commonly invest across the whole economy. If climate change threatens economic development, and especially if there are many or significant impacts, it will also therefore be likely to undermine the ability of pension funds and other institutional investors to fulfil their aims, so it is in their interests to see that risks associated with climate change are minimised. Whilst this responsibility is widely shared, institutional investors are uniquely suited to take particular actions.'' Having identified climate change as its central focus, USS opted for positive engagement with companies rather than the perceived negative strategies of proxyvoting battles, minority shareholder resolutions at annual general meetings, and media-driven attacks on corporate reputations. (11) Because pension-fund investors are driven by share-price concerns, they use their ownership position to reduce the risk of adverse unexpected share-price movements rather than as an instrument of social change. This kind of risk is increasingly understood in terms of the social and environmental performance of the firm, particularly when substandard performance in the third world sends reputation and brand-related signals into the marketplace.
Despite its use of terms such as socially responsible investing (SRI) and responsible investing to describe their investment policy, USS does not consider its actions to be part of the SRI movement. For the vast majority of pension funds, the SRI movement is considered to be outside the mainstream of investment management. Nor does it align its corporate engagement approach with`noisy' pension-fund activists such as CalPERS. Although USS votes its proxies, it does not publicize lists of companies it plans to target for improvement, nor has it ever submitted a minority shareholder resolution calling attention to the risky behaviour of firms. In fact, the belief of USS is that these types of approaches are blunt tools that often fail to achieve the changes in corporate behaviour which are sought. From the USS point of view, the senior management of such targeted firms does not always understand the message that is being delivered by disgruntled shareholders in such forums. Basically, USS approaches its engagement with corporations as primarily a risk-reduction strategy. Through the demand for more information and higher firm-level standards of behaviour, Peter Moon, USS senior investment officer, suggested``we are making capitalism more efficient'' (personal interview, London, 4 July 2003).
As a result of the`behind the scenes approach' of USS, it is hard to identify precisely where there has been influence. In effect, USS seeks to preempt brand and reputational damage before it occurs either in the consumer or capital markets, acting before, rather than after, a decline in earnings, share prices, and the P/E ratio. In this way, positive corporate engagement is like an insurance policy taken out on something that subsequently does not occur. The results are difficult to measure either directly through share-price changes or indirectly through corporate behavioural changes (11) In this paper, given its overarching argument and focus upon corporate engagement, we do not consider the nature and scope of proxy votes in advancing social and environmental issues. Even so, there is increasing evidence to the effect that high-profile shareholder resolutions can have significant impacts on corporate managers' behaviour over a wide variety of issues. For useful overviews of the theory and practice of proxy voting, see Maug (1999) and Romano (2003) . On the institutional basis of proxy voting, see the web sites http://www.corpgov.net/forums and http://www.issproxy.
because we are not told where such engagement has occurred in order to maintain the positive reputation of the firm. Though we are able to assume, given the size of USS holdings in BP and Shell, that such positive engagement has occurred, in light of the magnitude of issues to be tackled under climate change the impacts are hard to quantify. However, the recent pledge of BP to move`beyond petroleum' may speak to the power of such institutional investors' corporate engagement, and certainly speaks to the significance of corporate social responsibility that more and more firms wish to associate with their brand.
USS has quantified some impacts of its engagements with firms before rather than after reputational damage and declining share price have eroded shareholder value. Two examples are their intervention with the UK construction company Balfour Beatty and with pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). In the case of Balfour Beatty, USS was one of many voices pressing the company to withdraw from the Turkish Ilisu Dam project. Late in 2001 Balfour Beatty reversed its position on this project and withdrew. Nowhere in the company's official press release is there mention of institutional owners' intervention on this topic. But from anecdotal evidence, we know there was considerable behind-the-scenes pressure on the firm given the negative reputation effects such an environmentally damaging project could inflict on the firm's share prices.
A second example of USS direct engagement with companies in its investment portfolio was its intervention with GSK, the second largest holding (valued at »550 million). USS sought to avoid reputational damage and the resulting decline in longterm share value by urging GSK to withdraw from the court case against the South African government concerning the manufacture of generic AIDS drugs. In April 2001 GSK and other global drug manufacturers agreed to drop their legal case and subsequently offered low-cost AIDS drugs to South Africa and other developing countries. In the same time period, GSK announced profits of US $5.8 billion, with only 2% percent of its revenue from markets in developing countries. Institutional investors believed that the potential for reputation damage from the South Africa court case far outweighed the threat posed to the pharmaceutical industries' intellectual property rights.
It is hard to quantify the effect of such leverage on share price and long-term performance. What is important is the USS pattern of positive engagement with firms that represent significant holdings in its portfolio on issues of reputational risk. Additionally, two of these three firms, BP and GSK, are global leaders in their sectors, with strong brand image easily tarnished by public dispute. Consumer boycotts in First World markets are a real possibility given the sensitivity of educated consumers to these issues.
Conclusions
Three arguments are made in this paper. First, firms that value brand image are vulnerable to counterclaims about the virtues or otherwise of their corporate behaviour. When corporate behaviour runs counter to the societal norms embedded in their brands, outside agents may be able to target brand image in the media in order to highlight the irresponsible acts of companies. Furthermore, the global supply chains characteristic to these firms leave them vulnerable to the very different standards of production between less developed countries and the developed consumer markets of the West where the products are sold (Hughes, 2001) . Such media attacks can undercut the positive brand images that these firms want associated with their products.
The second argument of our paper is that pension funds, and institutional investors more generally, who dominate global capital markets are increasingly sensitive to reputational attacks on the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. We argue that their concern is not the result of an abiding interest in corporate social responsibility. Rather, there is increasing awareness of the costs of systemic attacks on brand image and corporate reputation because such attacks can have a direct impact on institutional investors' portfolio returns through adverse current and future stock price changes. The more extended the global supply chains of firms in their investment portfolios, the more risk these types of investors face through their long-term investment strategies.
The third argument of the paper revolves around the response of institutional investors to these increased levels of risk in their portfolios. We contend that pension funds and institutional investors hold increasing numbers of global firms directly accountable for their governance, social, and environmental behaviour. These types of investors demand higher standards of corporate behaviour than those required of many emerging markets, particularly in those developing countries in which social, labor, and environmental regulations are kept deliberately low in order to attract and keep these companies. In order to hold companies to account, institutional investors require greater corporate transparency so as to be able to judge the risks inherent in their business strategies.
From these arguments, we draw four implications. In the first instance, it could be argued that we have entered a new phase in the relationship between large shareholders and their firms. Indeed, our argument is an elaboration of a previous argument to the effect that Anglo-American economies are now in what might be termed the fifth stage of capitalism (see Clark and Hebb, 2004) . Not content with`revealed' performance through stock-market prices, large institutional investors have sought to affect the announced results of firms and, hence, future stock-market prices. This is entirely consistent with the world in which large institutional investors find themselvesöa world with few options for exit, and with limited power to directly influence the behaviour of corporate executives. At the limit, however, this type of policy and the use of financial leverage by`insiders' reassembles continental European systems of corporate governance that give preference to large shareholders over small shareholders. Granted, the institutional form is very different. But there is little doubt that engagement may give those involved preferential access and claim to market-sensitive information (compare with Perotti and von Thadden, 2002) .
One consequence of institutional-investor interest in ex ante information has been a growing market for third-party quantitative and qualitative assessments of firm governance practices. These types of assessments are a way of providing institutional investors with the kind of summary information necessary for judging the ex ante risks associated with investing in different types of companies. Ratings firms publicize their assessments, thereby providing to the market, and especially for those unable to claim status as preferred`insiders', systematic information on the governance characteristics of firms. Most interestingly, the ratings market has a variety of clients, some of which have a narrow interest in the form of corporate governance whereas others have an interest in a wide variety of social and environmental standards (Clark et al, 2006) . Indeed, there is an active research programme amongst institutional investors seeking to evaluate the relationship between standards of corporate governance and social and environmental responsibility. If it can be shown that these two elements are related then social activists may have a vital clue in their campaigns to affect the role and responsibilities of firms in global consumer markets (Bauer et al, 2002 ).
In our assessment of the relationship between global standards and corporate engagement little was said of any moral commitment to global justice. This issue is not on the agenda for institutional investors such as CalPERS and USS. Most importantly, this is because an explicit concern with global justice would run counter to the fiduciary responsibilities of pension-fund trustees and their service providers in the investment-management industry. In any event, to characterise the issue as one of global justice would be to introduce a level of dispute and contention that runs counter to the presumption in favour of collegial and consensual decisionmaking within these institutions (Clark, 2000) . To imagine that these institutions could carry a moral agenda as well as a financial agenda would be to mistake cause and effect. There seems little doubt that engagement strategies can increase global social and environmental performance but that effect is a collateral benefit rather than the explicit object of corporate engagement itself. The most important reference points for affecting global justice remain community sentiments and the actions of social activists who can mobilize the tastes and preferences of consumers.
Fourth, we would suggest that regulators must sustain their current initiatives in the area of corporate governance: that is, improving transparency with respect to corporate decisionmaking, ensuring that boards of directors have independent directors, and, most importantly, expanding shareholder and stakeholder representatives. Furthermore, there is a significant role in improving corporate reporting standards such that the market for corporate ratings grows in ways consistent with the spread of diverse forms of information throughout securities markets, and beyond.
